fork_process.h File Reference

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Functions
pid_t	fork_process (void)

Function Documentation

fork_process()

pid_t fork_process

(

void

)

Definition at line 32 of file fork_process.c.

References close, fd(), setitimer(), generate_unaccent_rules::stdout, and write.

Referenced by BackendRun(), BackendStartup(), do_start_bgworker(), pgarch_start(), pgstat_start(), StartAutoVacWorker(), StartChildProcess(), and SysLogger_Start().

{
    pid_t       result;
    const char *oomfilename;

#ifdef LINUX_PROFILE
    struct itimerval prof_itimer;
#endif

    /*
     * Flush stdio channels just before fork, to avoid double-output problems.
     * Ideally we'd use fflush(NULL) here, but there are still a few non-ANSI
     * stdio libraries out there (like SunOS 4.1.x) that coredump if we do.
     * Presently stdout and stderr are the only stdio output channels used by
     * the postmaster, so fflush'ing them should be sufficient.
     */
    fflush(stdout);
    fflush(stderr);

#ifdef LINUX_PROFILE

    /*
     * Linux's fork() resets the profiling timer in the child process. If we
     * want to profile child processes then we need to save and restore the
     * timer setting.  This is a waste of time if not profiling, however, so
     * only do it if commanded by specific -DLINUX_PROFILE switch.
     */
    getitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &prof_itimer);
#endif

    result = fork();
    if (result == 0)
    {
        /* fork succeeded, in child */
#ifdef LINUX_PROFILE
        setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &prof_itimer, NULL);
#endif

        /*
         * By default, Linux tends to kill the postmaster in out-of-memory
         * situations, because it blames the postmaster for the sum of child
         * process sizes *including shared memory*.  (This is unbelievably
         * stupid, but the kernel hackers seem uninterested in improving it.)
         * Therefore it's often a good idea to protect the postmaster by
         * setting its OOM score adjustment negative (which has to be done in
         * a root-owned startup script).  Since the adjustment is inherited by
         * child processes, this would ordinarily mean that all the
         * postmaster's children are equally protected against OOM kill, which
         * is not such a good idea.  So we provide this code to allow the
         * children to change their OOM score adjustments again.  Both the
         * file name to write to and the value to write are controlled by
         * environment variables, which can be set by the same startup script
         * that did the original adjustment.
         */
        oomfilename = getenv("PG_OOM_ADJUST_FILE");

        if (oomfilename != NULL)
        {
            /*
             * Use open() not stdio, to ensure we control the open flags. Some
             * Linux security environments reject anything but O_WRONLY.
             */
            int         fd = open(oomfilename, O_WRONLY, 0);

            /* We ignore all errors */
            if (fd >= 0)
            {
                const char *oomvalue = getenv("PG_OOM_ADJUST_VALUE");
                int         rc;

                if (oomvalue == NULL)   /* supply a useful default */
                    oomvalue = "0";

                rc = write(fd, oomvalue, strlen(oomvalue));
                (void) rc;
                close(fd);
            }
        }

        /*
         * Make sure processes do not share OpenSSL randomness state.
         */
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
        RAND_cleanup();
#endif
    }

    return result;
}