fe-auth-scram.c

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/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 *
 * fe-auth-scram.c
 *     The front-end (client) implementation of SCRAM authentication.
 *
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2025, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
 *
 * IDENTIFICATION
 *    src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c
 *
 *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 */
 
#include "postgres_fe.h"
 
#include "common/base64.h"
#include "common/hmac.h"
#include "common/saslprep.h"
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
 
 
/* The exported SCRAM callback mechanism. */
static void *scram_init(PGconn *conn, const char *password,
                        const char *sasl_mechanism);
static SASLStatus scram_exchange(void *opaq, bool final,
                                 char *input, int inputlen,
                                 char **output, int *outputlen);
static bool scram_channel_bound(void *opaq);
static void scram_free(void *opaq);
 
const pg_fe_sasl_mech pg_scram_mech = {
    scram_init,
    scram_exchange,
    scram_channel_bound,
    scram_free
};
 
/*
 * Status of exchange messages used for SCRAM authentication via the
 * SASL protocol.
 */
typedef enum
{
    FE_SCRAM_INIT,
    FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT,
    FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT,
    FE_SCRAM_FINISHED,
} fe_scram_state_enum;
 
typedef struct
{
    fe_scram_state_enum state;
 
    /* These are supplied by the user */
    PGconn     *conn;
    char       *password;
    char       *sasl_mechanism;
 
    /* State data depending on the hash type */
    pg_cryptohash_type hash_type;
    int         key_length;
 
    /* We construct these */
    uint8       SaltedPassword[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
    char       *client_nonce;
    char       *client_first_message_bare;
    char       *client_final_message_without_proof;
 
    /* These come from the server-first message */
    char       *server_first_message;
    uint8      *salt;
    int         saltlen;
    int         iterations;
    char       *nonce;
 
    /* These come from the server-final message */
    char       *server_final_message;
    uint8       ServerSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
} fe_scram_state;
 
static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input);
static bool read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input);
static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state);
static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state);
static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match,
                                    const char **errstr);
static bool calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
                                   const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
                                   uint8 *result, const char **errstr);
 
/*
 * Initialize SCRAM exchange status.
 */
static void *
scram_init(PGconn *conn,
           const char *password,
           const char *sasl_mechanism)
{
    fe_scram_state *state;
    char       *prep_password;
    pg_saslprep_rc rc;
 
    Assert(sasl_mechanism != NULL);
 
    state = (fe_scram_state *) malloc(sizeof(fe_scram_state));
    if (!state)
        return NULL;
    memset(state, 0, sizeof(fe_scram_state));
    state->conn = conn;
    state->state = FE_SCRAM_INIT;
    state->key_length = SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN;
    state->hash_type = PG_SHA256;
 
    state->sasl_mechanism = strdup(sasl_mechanism);
    if (!state->sasl_mechanism)
    {
        free(state);
        return NULL;
    }
 
    if (password)
    {
        /* Normalize the password with SASLprep, if possible */
        rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
        if (rc == SASLPREP_OOM)
        {
            free(state->sasl_mechanism);
            free(state);
            return NULL;
        }
        if (rc != SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
        {
            prep_password = strdup(password);
            if (!prep_password)
            {
                free(state->sasl_mechanism);
                free(state);
                return NULL;
            }
        }
        state->password = prep_password;
    }
 
    return state;
}
 
/*
 * Return true if channel binding was employed and the SCRAM exchange
 * completed. This should be used after a successful exchange to determine
 * whether the server authenticated itself to the client.
 *
 * Note that the caller must also ensure that the exchange was actually
 * successful.
 */
static bool
scram_channel_bound(void *opaq)
{
    fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
 
    /* no SCRAM exchange done */
    if (state == NULL)
        return false;
 
    /* SCRAM exchange not completed */
    if (state->state != FE_SCRAM_FINISHED)
        return false;
 
    /* channel binding mechanism not used */
    if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) != 0)
        return false;
 
    /* all clear! */
    return true;
}
 
/*
 * Free SCRAM exchange status
 */
static void
scram_free(void *opaq)
{
    fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
 
    free(state->password);
    free(state->sasl_mechanism);
 
    /* client messages */
    free(state->client_nonce);
    free(state->client_first_message_bare);
    free(state->client_final_message_without_proof);
 
    /* first message from server */
    free(state->server_first_message);
    free(state->salt);
    free(state->nonce);
 
    /* final message from server */
    free(state->server_final_message);
 
    free(state);
}
 
/*
 * Exchange a SCRAM message with backend.
 */
static SASLStatus
scram_exchange(void *opaq, bool final,
               char *input, int inputlen,
               char **output, int *outputlen)
{
    fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
    PGconn     *conn = state->conn;
    const char *errstr = NULL;
 
    *output = NULL;
    *outputlen = 0;
 
    /*
     * Check that the input length agrees with the string length of the input.
     * We can ignore inputlen after this.
     */
    if (state->state != FE_SCRAM_INIT)
    {
        if (inputlen == 0)
        {
            libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (empty message)");
            return SASL_FAILED;
        }
        if (inputlen != strlen(input))
        {
            libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (length mismatch)");
            return SASL_FAILED;
        }
    }
 
    switch (state->state)
    {
        case FE_SCRAM_INIT:
            /* Begin the SCRAM handshake, by sending client nonce */
            *output = build_client_first_message(state);
            if (*output == NULL)
                return SASL_FAILED;
 
            *outputlen = strlen(*output);
            state->state = FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT;
            return SASL_CONTINUE;
 
        case FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT:
            /* Receive salt and server nonce, send response. */
            if (!read_server_first_message(state, input))
                return SASL_FAILED;
 
            *output = build_client_final_message(state);
            if (*output == NULL)
                return SASL_FAILED;
 
            *outputlen = strlen(*output);
            state->state = FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT;
            return SASL_CONTINUE;
 
        case FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT:
            {
                bool        match;
 
                /* Receive server signature */
                if (!read_server_final_message(state, input))
                    return SASL_FAILED;
 
                /*
                 * Verify server signature, to make sure we're talking to the
                 * genuine server.
                 */
                if (!verify_server_signature(state, &match, &errstr))
                {
                    libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not verify server signature: %s", errstr);
                    return SASL_FAILED;
                }
 
                if (!match)
                {
                    libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "incorrect server signature");
                }
                state->state = FE_SCRAM_FINISHED;
                state->conn->client_finished_auth = true;
                return match ? SASL_COMPLETE : SASL_FAILED;
            }
 
        default:
            /* shouldn't happen */
            libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "invalid SCRAM exchange state");
            break;
    }
 
    return SASL_FAILED;
}
 
/*
 * Read value for an attribute part of a SCRAM message.
 *
 * The buffer at **input is destructively modified, and *input is
 * advanced over the "attr=value" string and any following comma.
 *
 * On failure, append an error message to *errorMessage and return NULL.
 */
static char *
read_attr_value(char **input, char attr, PQExpBuffer errorMessage)
{
    char       *begin = *input;
    char       *end;
 
    if (*begin != attr)
    {
        libpq_append_error(errorMessage,
                           "malformed SCRAM message (attribute \"%c\" expected)",
                           attr);
        return NULL;
    }
    begin++;
 
    if (*begin != '=')
    {
        libpq_append_error(errorMessage,
                           "malformed SCRAM message (expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\")",
                           attr);
        return NULL;
    }
    begin++;
 
    end = begin;
    while (*end && *end != ',')
        end++;
 
    if (*end)
    {
        *end = '\0';
        *input = end + 1;
    }
    else
        *input = end;
 
    return begin;
}
 
/*
 * Build the first exchange message sent by the client.
 */
static char *
build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state)
{
    PGconn     *conn = state->conn;
    uint8       raw_nonce[SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN + 1];
    char       *result;
    int         channel_info_len;
    int         encoded_len;
    PQExpBufferData buf;
 
    /*
     * Generate a "raw" nonce.  This is converted to ASCII-printable form by
     * base64-encoding it.
     */
    if (!pg_strong_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN))
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not generate nonce");
        return NULL;
    }
 
    encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN);
    /* don't forget the zero-terminator */
    state->client_nonce = malloc(encoded_len + 1);
    if (state->client_nonce == NULL)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
        return NULL;
    }
    encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN,
                                state->client_nonce, encoded_len);
    if (encoded_len < 0)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encode nonce");
        return NULL;
    }
    state->client_nonce[encoded_len] = '\0';
 
    /*
     * Generate message.  The username is left empty as the backend uses the
     * value provided by the startup packet.  Also, as this username is not
     * prepared with SASLprep, the message parsing would fail if it includes
     * '=' or ',' characters.
     */
 
    initPQExpBuffer(&buf);
 
    /*
     * First build the gs2-header with channel binding information.
     */
    if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0)
    {
        Assert(conn->ssl_in_use);
        appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "p=tls-server-end-point");
    }
#ifdef USE_SSL
    else if (conn->channel_binding[0] != 'd' && /* disable */
             conn->ssl_in_use)
    {
        /*
         * Client supports channel binding, but thinks the server does not.
         */
        appendPQExpBufferChar(&buf, 'y');
    }
#endif
    else
    {
        /*
         * Client does not support channel binding, or has disabled it.
         */
        appendPQExpBufferChar(&buf, 'n');
    }
 
    if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
        goto oom_error;
 
    channel_info_len = buf.len;
 
    appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, ",,n=,r=%s", state->client_nonce);
    if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
        goto oom_error;
 
    /*
     * The first message content needs to be saved without channel binding
     * information.
     */
    state->client_first_message_bare = strdup(buf.data + channel_info_len + 2);
    if (!state->client_first_message_bare)
        goto oom_error;
 
    result = strdup(buf.data);
    if (result == NULL)
        goto oom_error;
 
    termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
    return result;
 
oom_error:
    termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
    libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
    return NULL;
}
 
/*
 * Build the final exchange message sent from the client.
 */
static char *
build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state)
{
    PQExpBufferData buf;
    PGconn     *conn = state->conn;
    uint8       client_proof[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
    char       *result;
    int         encoded_len;
    const char *errstr = NULL;
 
    initPQExpBuffer(&buf);
 
    /*
     * Construct client-final-message-without-proof.  We need to remember it
     * for verifying the server proof in the final step of authentication.
     *
     * The channel binding flag handling (p/y/n) must be consistent with
     * build_client_first_message(), because the server will check that it's
     * the same flag both times.
     */
    if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0)
    {
#ifdef USE_SSL
        char       *cbind_data = NULL;
        size_t      cbind_data_len = 0;
        size_t      cbind_header_len;
        char       *cbind_input;
        size_t      cbind_input_len;
        int         encoded_cbind_len;
 
        /* Fetch hash data of server's SSL certificate */
        cbind_data =
            pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(state->conn,
                                            &cbind_data_len);
        if (cbind_data == NULL)
        {
            /* error message is already set on error */
            termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
            return NULL;
        }
 
        appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=");
 
        /* p=type,, */
        cbind_header_len = strlen("p=tls-server-end-point,,");
        cbind_input_len = cbind_header_len + cbind_data_len;
        cbind_input = malloc(cbind_input_len);
        if (!cbind_input)
        {
            free(cbind_data);
            goto oom_error;
        }
        memcpy(cbind_input, "p=tls-server-end-point,,", cbind_header_len);
        memcpy(cbind_input + cbind_header_len, cbind_data, cbind_data_len);
 
        encoded_cbind_len = pg_b64_enc_len(cbind_input_len);
        if (!enlargePQExpBuffer(&buf, encoded_cbind_len))
        {
            free(cbind_data);
            free(cbind_input);
            goto oom_error;
        }
        encoded_cbind_len = pg_b64_encode((uint8 *) cbind_input, cbind_input_len,
                                          buf.data + buf.len,
                                          encoded_cbind_len);
        if (encoded_cbind_len < 0)
        {
            free(cbind_data);
            free(cbind_input);
            termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
            appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
                                 "could not encode cbind data for channel binding\n");
            return NULL;
        }
        buf.len += encoded_cbind_len;
        buf.data[buf.len] = '\0';
 
        free(cbind_data);
        free(cbind_input);
#else
        /*
         * Chose channel binding, but the SSL library doesn't support it.
         * Shouldn't happen.
         */
        termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
        appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
                             "channel binding not supported by this build\n");
        return NULL;
#endif                          /* USE_SSL */
    }
#ifdef USE_SSL
    else if (conn->channel_binding[0] != 'd' && /* disable */
             conn->ssl_in_use)
        appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=eSws");   /* base64 of "y,," */
#endif
    else
        appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=biws");   /* base64 of "n,," */
 
    if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
        goto oom_error;
 
    appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, ",r=%s", state->nonce);
    if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
        goto oom_error;
 
    state->client_final_message_without_proof = strdup(buf.data);
    if (state->client_final_message_without_proof == NULL)
        goto oom_error;
 
    /* Append proof to it, to form client-final-message. */
    if (!calculate_client_proof(state,
                                state->client_final_message_without_proof,
                                client_proof, &errstr))
    {
        termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not calculate client proof: %s", errstr);
        return NULL;
    }
 
    appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, ",p=");
    encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(state->key_length);
    if (!enlargePQExpBuffer(&buf, encoded_len))
        goto oom_error;
    encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(client_proof,
                                state->key_length,
                                buf.data + buf.len,
                                encoded_len);
    if (encoded_len < 0)
    {
        termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encode client proof");
        return NULL;
    }
    buf.len += encoded_len;
    buf.data[buf.len] = '\0';
 
    result = strdup(buf.data);
    if (result == NULL)
        goto oom_error;
 
    termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
    return result;
 
oom_error:
    termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
    libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
    return NULL;
}
 
/*
 * Read the first exchange message coming from the server.
 */
static bool
read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input)
{
    PGconn     *conn = state->conn;
    char       *iterations_str;
    char       *endptr;
    char       *encoded_salt;
    char       *nonce;
    int         decoded_salt_len;
 
    state->server_first_message = strdup(input);
    if (state->server_first_message == NULL)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
        return false;
    }
 
    /* parse the message */
    nonce = read_attr_value(&input, 'r',
                            &conn->errorMessage);
    if (nonce == NULL)
    {
        /* read_attr_value() has appended an error string */
        return false;
    }
 
    /* Verify immediately that the server used our part of the nonce */
    if (strlen(nonce) < strlen(state->client_nonce) ||
        memcmp(nonce, state->client_nonce, strlen(state->client_nonce)) != 0)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "invalid SCRAM response (nonce mismatch)");
        return false;
    }
 
    state->nonce = strdup(nonce);
    if (state->nonce == NULL)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
        return false;
    }
 
    encoded_salt = read_attr_value(&input, 's', &conn->errorMessage);
    if (encoded_salt == NULL)
    {
        /* read_attr_value() has appended an error string */
        return false;
    }
    decoded_salt_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_salt));
    state->salt = malloc(decoded_salt_len);
    if (state->salt == NULL)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
        return false;
    }
    state->saltlen = pg_b64_decode(encoded_salt,
                                   strlen(encoded_salt),
                                   state->salt,
                                   decoded_salt_len);
    if (state->saltlen < 0)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (invalid salt)");
        return false;
    }
 
    iterations_str = read_attr_value(&input, 'i', &conn->errorMessage);
    if (iterations_str == NULL)
    {
        /* read_attr_value() has appended an error string */
        return false;
    }
    state->iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &endptr, 10);
    if (*endptr != '\0' || state->iterations < 1)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (invalid iteration count)");
        return false;
    }
 
    if (*input != '\0')
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-first-message)");
 
    return true;
}
 
/*
 * Read the final exchange message coming from the server.
 */
static bool
read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input)
{
    PGconn     *conn = state->conn;
    char       *encoded_server_signature;
    uint8      *decoded_server_signature;
    int         server_signature_len;
 
    state->server_final_message = strdup(input);
    if (!state->server_final_message)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
        return false;
    }
 
    /* Check for error result. */
    if (*input == 'e')
    {
        char       *errmsg = read_attr_value(&input, 'e',
                                             &conn->errorMessage);
 
        if (errmsg == NULL)
        {
            /* read_attr_value() has appended an error message */
            return false;
        }
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "error received from server in SCRAM exchange: %s",
                                errmsg);
        return false;
    }
 
    /* Parse the message. */
    encoded_server_signature = read_attr_value(&input, 'v',
                                               &conn->errorMessage);
    if (encoded_server_signature == NULL)
    {
        /* read_attr_value() has appended an error message */
        return false;
    }
 
    if (*input != '\0')
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-final-message)");
 
    server_signature_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_server_signature));
    decoded_server_signature = malloc(server_signature_len);
    if (!decoded_server_signature)
    {
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory");
        return false;
    }
 
    server_signature_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_signature,
                                         strlen(encoded_server_signature),
                                         decoded_server_signature,
                                         server_signature_len);
    if (server_signature_len != state->key_length)
    {
        free(decoded_server_signature);
        libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (invalid server signature)");
        return false;
    }
    memcpy(state->ServerSignature, decoded_server_signature,
           state->key_length);
    free(decoded_server_signature);
 
    return true;
}
 
/*
 * Calculate the client proof, part of the final exchange message sent
 * by the client.  Returns true on success, false on failure with *errstr
 * pointing to a message about the error details.
 */
static bool
calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
                       const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
                       uint8 *result, const char **errstr)
{
    uint8       StoredKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
    uint8       ClientKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
    uint8       ClientSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
    int         i;
    pg_hmac_ctx *ctx;
 
    ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type);
    if (ctx == NULL)
    {
        *errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL);  /* returns OOM */
        return false;
    }
 
    if (state->conn->scram_client_key_binary)
    {
        memcpy(ClientKey, state->conn->scram_client_key_binary, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN);
    }
    else
    {
        /*
         * Calculate SaltedPassword, and store it in 'state' so that we can
         * reuse it later in verify_server_signature.
         */
        if (scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->hash_type,
                                 state->key_length, state->salt, state->saltlen,
                                 state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword,
                                 errstr) < 0 ||
            scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, state->hash_type,
                            state->key_length, ClientKey, errstr) < 0)
        {
            /* errstr is already filled here */
            pg_hmac_free(ctx);
            return false;
        }
    }
 
    if (scram_H(ClientKey, state->hash_type, state->key_length, StoredKey, errstr) < 0)
    {
        pg_hmac_free(ctx);
        return false;
    }
 
    if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, StoredKey, state->key_length) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx,
                       (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare,
                       strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx,
                       (uint8 *) state->server_first_message,
                       strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx,
                       (uint8 *) client_final_message_without_proof,
                       strlen(client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_final(ctx, ClientSignature, state->key_length) < 0)
    {
        *errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx);
        pg_hmac_free(ctx);
        return false;
    }
 
    for (i = 0; i < state->key_length; i++)
        result[i] = ClientKey[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];
 
    pg_hmac_free(ctx);
    return true;
}
 
/*
 * Validate the server signature, received as part of the final exchange
 * message received from the server.  *match tracks if the server signature
 * matched or not. Returns true if the server signature got verified, and
 * false for a processing error with *errstr pointing to a message about the
 * error details.
 */
static bool
verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match,
                        const char **errstr)
{
    uint8       expected_ServerSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
    uint8       ServerKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
    pg_hmac_ctx *ctx;
 
    ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type);
    if (ctx == NULL)
    {
        *errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL);  /* returns OOM */
        return false;
    }
 
    if (state->conn->scram_server_key_binary)
    {
        memcpy(ServerKey, state->conn->scram_server_key_binary, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN);
    }
    else
    {
        if (scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, state->hash_type,
                            state->key_length, ServerKey, errstr) < 0)
        {
            /* errstr is filled already */
            pg_hmac_free(ctx);
            return false;
        }
    }
 
    /* calculate ServerSignature */
    if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, ServerKey, state->key_length) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx,
                       (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare,
                       strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx,
                       (uint8 *) state->server_first_message,
                       strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_update(ctx,
                       (uint8 *) state->client_final_message_without_proof,
                       strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
        pg_hmac_final(ctx, expected_ServerSignature,
                      state->key_length) < 0)
    {
        *errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx);
        pg_hmac_free(ctx);
        return false;
    }
 
    pg_hmac_free(ctx);
 
    /* signature processed, so now check after it */
    if (memcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature,
               state->key_length) != 0)
        *match = false;
    else
        *match = true;
 
    return true;
}
 
/*
 * Build a new SCRAM secret.
 *
 * On error, returns NULL and sets *errstr to point to a message about the
 * error details.
 */
char *
pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password, int iterations, const char **errstr)
{
    char       *prep_password;
    pg_saslprep_rc rc;
    uint8       saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN];
    char       *result;
 
    /*
     * Normalize the password with SASLprep.  If that doesn't work, because
     * the password isn't valid UTF-8 or contains prohibited characters, just
     * proceed with the original password.  (See comments at the top of
     * auth-scram.c.)
     */
    rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
    if (rc == SASLPREP_OOM)
    {
        *errstr = libpq_gettext("out of memory");
        return NULL;
    }
    if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
        password = (const char *) prep_password;
 
    /* Generate a random salt */
    if (!pg_strong_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN))
    {
        *errstr = libpq_gettext("could not generate random salt");
        free(prep_password);
        return NULL;
    }
 
    result = scram_build_secret(PG_SHA256, SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN, saltbuf,
                                SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
                                iterations, password,
                                errstr);
 
    free(prep_password);
 
    return result;
}